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Like most perceptual attributes, the perception of numerosity is susceptible 
to adaptation, both to prolonged viewing of spatial arrays and to repeated 
motor actions such as hand-tapping. However, the possibility has been raised 
that adaptation may reflect response biases rather than modification of 
sensory processing. To disentangle these two possibilities, we studied visual 
and motor adaptation of numerosity perception while measuring confidence 
and reaction-times. Both sensory and motor adaptation robustly distorted 
numerosity estimates, and these shifts in perceived numerosity were 
accompanied by similar shifts in confidence and reaction-time distributions. 
After adaptation, maximum uncertainty and slowest response-times occurred 
at the point of subjective (rather than physical) equality of the matching task, 
suggesting that adaptation acts directly on the sensory representation of 
numerosity, before the decisional processes. On the other hand, making 
reward response-contingent, which also caused robust shifts in the 
psychometric function, caused no significant shifts in confidence or reaction-
time distributions. These results reinforce evidence for shared mechanisms 
that encode the quantity of both internally and externally generated events, 
and advance a useful general technique to test whether contextual effects like 
adaptation and serial dependence really affect sensory processing.  
 









Perceptual adaptation is a form of short-term plasticity, usually generated by observing 2 
for some time a particular stimulus, such as a steadily drifting pattern. Adaptation has 3 
proven to be a fundamental psychophysical tool to study many perceptual properties, 4 
including high-level properties such as face identity and expression [1–3]. It has also 5 
proven invaluable in the study of the perception of numerosity, bringing this field of 6 
cognitive research into the realm of perceptual research [4–6]. Recently, cross-modal 7 
and cross-format adaptation have been used to demonstrate a “generalized sense of 8 
number”, showing strong interactions between the numerosities of spatial arrays of 9 
objects and temporal sequences of events [7]. Even more intriguingly, the authors went 10 
on to show interactions between numerosity perception and motor action: fast tapping 11 
reduces the apparent numerosity of both temporal sequences and spatial arrays, while 12 
slow tapping has the opposite effect [8]. 13 
These results are clearly important as they point to specific neural interactions 14 
between different forms of numerosity representation, reinforcing the 15 
neurophysiological evidence reported in macaque monkeys [9]. They also show strong 16 
neural links between numerosity and motor action, again with parallels in the 17 
neurophysiological literature [10]. But do adaptation studies truly reveal underlying 18 
neural mechanisms as Mollon [1] claimed (“if you can adapt it it’s there”)? Can we 19 
think of adaptation as the “psychologists microelectrode”, as suggested by Frisby [11]? 20 
It has recently been questioned whether adaptation necessary reveals underlying neural 21 
mechanisms, with suggestions that they could result from changes in observer criteria, 22 
driven by cognitive, decisional processes, particularly for certain “high-level” 23 
aftereffects [for discussion see 12]. To demonstrate this possibility, Morgan et al. [13] 24 
showed that observers could simulate the effects of adaptation by adopting simple 25 
decision rules, along the lines of “if unsure say fewer”. This strategy resulted in a clear 26 
shift of psychometric functions, without broadening the width of the functions 27 
(reflecting preserved precision). Therefore, it is possible that in the numerosity 28 
adaptation experiments the changes in the psychometric functions do not reflect 29 
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changes in neural representations of number, but in a cognitive, decision strategy in 30 
reporting numerosity. Possibly after rapid tapping there is a tendency to report 31 
uncertain numerosities as low, and after slow tapping to report these as high. This could 32 
conceivably account for the changes in apparent numerosity, without invoking the 33 
action on neural mechanisms.  34 
Morgan et al.’s idea can be illustrated with a simple simulation shown in 35 
Figure 1. The red curve illustrates a typical psychometric function, modelled by a 36 
cumulative Gaussian error function. The blue curve illustrates a hypothetical function 37 
of subjective confidence, based on the consistency of participant responses: one when 38 
certain, zero when guessing. On the basis of data from this study (see Figure 3) we 39 
assume minimal confidence is 50%, but this is not essential to the demonstration. 40 
Confidence should be minimal at the point of subjective equality, where sensory 41 
information is least. The green curve is the simulation of the strategy “if unsure say 42 
‘fewer’” (the product of the two probability functions), causing a downward shift of 43 
the curve, which necessarily shifts the function rightwards. The downward shift in the 44 
curve is virtually indistinguishable from a rightward shift caused by sensory adaptation 45 
to numerosity. However, if it is confidence that drives the downward shift, the 46 
confidence function itself should not change, but remain centred at the PSE of the 47 
unadapted function.  48 
 49 
------------------------------  FIGURE 1 ------------------------------  50 
 51 
Gallagher and colleagues [14] took advantage of this fact to propose a novel way 52 
of distinguishing between sensory effects in adaptation and higher-level decisional 53 
biases, based on the assumption that confidence in the perceptual decision will scale 54 
with the strength of sensory evidence. In the typical two-alternative matching 55 
experiment used to measure adaptation, where participants choose which of two stimuli 56 
was the largest, the strength of sensory evidence will be weakest when their internal 57 
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representations of magnitude are the same: that is, at the point of subjective equality 58 
(PSE). Therefore, the PSE should also correspond to the point of minimal confidence. 59 
If the PSE shifts with adaptation-induced changes in internal representations of 60 
magnitude, the shift in PSE should be accompanied by a comparable shift in minimal 61 
confidence. If, on the other hand, the adaptation results from weak confidence and a 62 
decision rule (as simulated in Figure 1), the confidence ratings should remain minimal 63 
at the point of physical equality, and not shift with adaptation. Gallagher et al. [14] 64 
showed that adaptation to visual motion shifted not only the point of perceived equality 65 
of motion, but also the point of maximal decisional uncertainty. On the other hand, 66 
instructing participants to introduce a systematic response bias (along the lines of 67 
replicating Morgan et al.’s experiment) did not shift the point of maximal uncertainty.  68 
 Another common tool in sensory research is reaction-times, which also vary 69 
systematically with sensory strength, well approximated by a power function of the 70 
stimulus strength plus a constant [Piéron’s law: 15]. Following the same logic 71 
discussed above, reaction-times should also vary on a two alternative forced choice 72 
task, being maximal when the sensory representations of the two are most similar, at 73 
the point of subjective equality. Therefore, adaptation should also shift the peak in 74 
reaction-times, following the shift in PSE, if the effects are sensorial rather than 75 
decisional. If they remain anchored at physical equality, the adaptation is more likely 76 
to reflect response or decision biases.  77 
 In this study we investigate how adaptation to numerosity affects confidence 78 
ratings and reaction-times. We study two types of adaptation: visual adaptation to 79 
dense dot arrays [4], and motor adaptation to fast and slow hand-tapping [8]. The 80 
results show that both types of adaptation cause concomitant changes in both minimal 81 
confidence and maximal reaction-times, suggesting that the effects of both adaptation 82 
to high-numerosity and to manual tapping are sensory rather than biases in decision.  83 
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Methods 84 
Stimuli were presented on an Acer LCD monitor (screen resolution of 1920 X 1080, 85 
refresh rate 60 Hz) subtending 50° X 29° at the subject view distance of 57 cm. They 86 
were created with PsychToolbox routines for MATLAB (ver. R2016a, the Mathworks, 87 
Inc.) on a PC computer running Windows 7. In the motor adaptation conditions, hand 88 
movements were monitored by an infrared motion sensor device (Leap motion 89 
controller – https://www.leapmotion.com) running at 60 Hz.  90 
We used a standard forced-choice paradigm (Figure 2). Stimuli were brief 91 
(250 ms) patches of dots, presented sequentially to the left and right of fixation, with a 92 
200 ms pause between them. Each patch covered a circular region of 8° in diameter, 93 
centred at 7° from screen centre. Dots were 0.3° diameter, separated from each other 94 
by at least 0.25°, half white and half black (to balance luminance), presented on a grey 95 
background. The patch to the left of fixation was the reference, with numerosity fixed 96 
at 16 dots; that to the right was the probe, with numerosity varying randomly from 8 to 97 
32 dots (numerosity drawn from linear rectangle distribution). Participants first judged 98 
whether the stimulus on the left or the right appeared more numerous, then indicated 99 
their confidence in the judgments by pressing the up or down arrow (low or high 100 
confidence respectively). We also measured the reaction-times of the numerosity 101 
judgments, and report the mean, after removing outliers (more ±3 standard deviations 102 
from the mean).   103 
 104 
Adaptation 105 
For the visual adaptation experiment, 12 participants (11 naïve to the purpose of the 106 
study and 1 author; mean age 28 with normal or corrected-to-normal vision) adapted 107 
to an array of 60 dots (adapt to high) at the same position as the probe stimulus, for 40 108 
s at the beginning of each session, then for 6 s top-up periods. Stimuli were presented 109 
1 s after adaptation. Each participant performed a total of 432 trials. For the adaptation-110 
to-tapping experiment, participants (9 naïve to the purpose of the study and 1 author; 111 
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mean age 28 with normal or corrected-to-normal vision)  made a series of hand-tapping 112 
movements (pivoting at the wrist) on the right side of the screen until a white central 113 
fixation point turned red (the stop signal); 1 s later the stimuli were presented. In one 114 
condition participants tapped as rapidly as possible, in another at around 1 Hz. The 115 
program continuously monitored tapping via the infrared motion sensor: if a tap 116 
occurred after the presentation of the test stimulus, the trial would be aborted. After the 117 
stimuli presentation, subjects were required to press left arrow when the stimulus at 118 
left was perceived as more numerous, or right arrow when the righthand stimulus was 119 
perceived as more numerous. They then pressed up-arrow if they were confident about 120 
the numerosity response or down-arrow if they were not. Participants were unaware 121 
that we also measured the reaction-time of the numerosity response, and they were not 122 
explicitly asked to make speeded responses. Three blocks of 24 trials were run for each 123 
condition.  124 
 125 
 126 
Manipulation of rewards 127 
We devised a control experiment to compare with adaptation, where we manipulated 128 
the reward rules. 10 adults participated in this study, 9 naïve to the purpose of the study 129 
(mean age 28 with normal or corrected-to-normal vision). Here there was no 130 
adaptation, but participants played a point-based game, with three types of reward 131 
regimes (in different blocks). In baseline blocks, they received 1 point for each correct 132 
response and lost 1 for every error (performing on average at 85% correct). In “reward-133 
low” blocks, they received 2 points for correctly responded “less than”, and lost 1 for 134 
each error; and in “reward-high”, 2 points for correctly responding “greater than”, 135 
losing 1 for an error. They also indicated by pressing up-arrow if they were confident 136 
about the numerosity indicated was “less” or “greater than” or down arrow if they were 137 
not. They were given feedback on earning 50 points, and again at 80 points. Three 138 
blocks with at least 79 trials were run for each condition. We also measured the 139 
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reaction-time of the response, and again participants were not explicitly asked to make 140 
speeded responses. 141 
 142 
Data Analysis 143 
The proportion of trials where the test appeared more numerous than the probe was 144 
plotted against physical numerosity and fitted with cumulative Gaussian error 145 
functions. The median of the error functions estimates the point of subjective equality 146 
(PSE), and the difference in numerosity between the 50% and the 75% points gives the 147 
just notable difference (JND). The distributions of average confidence responses (1 for 148 
high, 0 for low) and of the mean of reaction-times were fitted with Gaussian 149 
distributions, and the peak of the fitted functions was taken as the point of maximum 150 
uncertainty or reaction-times.  151 
𝑃(𝑁) = 𝑏 + 𝑎 ∙ 𝑒𝑥𝑝 -.(/
0./)1
231
4       eqn. 2 152 
Where N is numerosity, P(N) the proportion of confident responses – or the 153 
average reaction-time – at that numerosity, b and a constants, 𝑁0 the mean of the 154 
Gaussian and σ the standard deviation. When fitting data pooled over participants, all 155 
parameters were free to vary. When fitting individual participant data, b and σ were 156 
fixed to the values obtained for the aggregate data.  157 
All analyses were performed both on the “aggregate participant”, pooling all data 158 
from all participants, and also on individual participant data. Significance of the 159 
aggregate data was calculated by bootstrap sign test: 10,000 reiterations, with 160 
replacement.  161 
Experimental procedures were approved by the local ethics committee 162 
(Comitato Etico Pediatrico Regionale Azienda Ospedaliero-Universitaria Meyer, 163 
Florence, Italy; protocol n. GR- 2013-02358262) and are in line with the declaration 164 
of Helsinki. All subjects gave written informed consent.  165 
 166 
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------------------------------  FIGURE 2 ------------------------------  167 
 168 
Results 169 
Effects of adaptation on confidence and reaction times 170 
We monitored decision confidence and reaction-times (in an un-speeded task) while 171 
participants made numerosity judgements after adaptation, either to dense visual 172 
patterns or to hand-tapping. The major results were obtained from analysis of the 173 
“aggregate observer”, pooling data over all 12 participants (10 in the adaptation to 174 
hand-tapping). However, we also analysed individual data from all participants 175 
separately and, although the reduced data were necessarily more noisy, the group 176 
analysis gave essentially the same results as the aggregate. The results of the individual 177 
analyses are reported in the supplementary material, and summarised in Figure S4 and 178 
table S1. 179 
Figure 3 shows the main results from the aggregate data. Figures 3A&B are 180 
psychometric functions, plotting the proportion of trials (for all participants) where the 181 
test was reported as more numerous than the reference, as a function of the numerosity 182 
of the test patch. Both data sets were well fit by cumulative Gaussian error functions, 183 
which were clearly displaced by adaptation, both by visual dot-patterns and hand-184 
tapping. In the un-adapted condition (Figure 3A, blue symbols and curves), the 185 
psychometric function was centred at 17 dots, very near the actual reference of 16 dots. 186 
Visual adaptation to 60 dots clearly displaced the psychometric function rightwards, 187 
shifting the median (which estimates the PSE) to 22.7 dots, meaning that after 188 
adaptation the probe needed to be 33% more numerous than the reference to appear 189 
equal to it. A similar effect occurred for hand-tapping: slow tapping had little effect, 190 
with the PSE remaining at 15.9 (near the reference), while fast taping increased it to 191 
18.1, again implying a decrease of apparent numerosity, in this case of 14%.  192 
 193 
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------------------------------  FIGURE 3 ------------------------------  194 
 195 
Both the confidence and mean reaction-time data were well fit by Gaussian 196 
functions (R2 > 0.75 in all cases). The peaks of these functions (indicated by the arrows, 197 
and reported in table S1), clearly also shift with adaptation, both to visual numerosity 198 
and hand-tapping. The shift is in the same direction as the shift in PSEs, tending to 199 
align peaks in confidence and reaction-times with the PSEs. These results on the 200 
aggregate observer are very similar to those obtained from analysis of individual 201 
participants (see supplemental material) 202 
The blue and red histograms of Figure 4 (A-D) show the results of bootstrapping 203 
(10,000 repetitions, sampling with replacement). On each repetition, estimates were 204 
made for PSE, point of minimal confidence and maximal reaction-time. It is clear from 205 
inspection that in all cases the distributions for the investigated conditions overlap very 206 
little, indicating that they are significantly different. Bootstrap sign test yielded 207 
significance levels of p < 0.003 in all cases. On adaptation to visual stimuli peaks in 208 
both the confidence (Figure 4 A) and reaction-time (Figure 4 C) were higher for the 209 
adapt-high condition than baseline in all 10,000 iterations (p < 10−4). On adaptation to 210 
tapping, peaks in confidence (Figure 4 B) were lower for the adapt-high than adapt-211 
low condition on only 34 iteration (p = 0.0034), and for reaction-times (Figure 4 D) 212 
only 20 times (p = 0.002) out of 10,000.  213 
We then used the bootstrapped distributions to pit two plausible models against 214 
each other: 1) that the shifts in the psychometric functions result from a response 215 
strategy for uncertain trials [13: illustrated in Figure 1]; 2) that the change reflects 216 
adaptation-induced changes within sensory circuits. Model 1 predicts that the 217 
confidence and reaction-time distributions should not move with adaptation, so those 218 
for the adapt-high should be closer to PSEbase (or PSElow) than to PSEhigh. On the other 219 
hand, model 2 predicts that both peaks should follow the shifts in PSE, and therefore 220 
be closer to PSEhigh. We tested this by bootstrap sign test, counting how many iterations 221 
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were closer to PSEbase (or PSElow) than PSEhigh. We also bootstrapped the PSEs 222 
themselves on each iteration, to include their error in the calculation (the orange 223 
distribution in Figure 4 shows the bootstrapped mid-points of the two PSEs). For visual 224 
adaptation, not a single iteration of either confidence or reaction-time peaks was closer 225 
to PSEbase than PSEhigh, implying the likelihood for the first model is p < 10−4. The 226 
tapping condition also showed a clear effect. For the confidence data, the likelihood of 227 
model 1 was p = 0.05, compared with p = 0.95 for model 2, giving a likelihood ratio 228 
of 19. Reaction-times were more significant, with likelihood of model 1 equal 229 
to 0.0064 compared with 0.9936 for model 2, 166 times less likely. All the 230 
bootstrapped sign tests provide strong evidence for model 2 for both types of 231 
adaptation, suggesting that the adaptation occurs within sensory rather than decision 232 
systems.  233 
 234 
------------------------------  FIGURE 4 ------------------------------  235 
 236 
To test the validity of the confidence ratings, we separated the data into high- 237 
and low-confidence trials and fitted psychometric functions separately for each, 238 
calculating the just noticeable difference (JND), from the standard deviation of the fit. 239 
Standard errors and significance were calculated by bootstrap. As there were 3 times 240 
as many trials judged confident than unconfident, the data for confident judgements 241 
were under-sampled during bootstrapping to match sample sizes. Figures 5A&B show 242 
JNDs for the high-confidence trials were significantly lower than that for low-243 
confidence, by at least a factor of two (p < 10−4 in all cases), consistent with the idea 244 
that subjective confidence  reflects a genuine metacognitive ability which assesses the 245 
quality of sensory evidence [16].  246 
 We also correlated reaction-times against confidence (Figures 5C&D). 247 
Each point of Figure 5C comes from Figures 3C&E, and those from Figure 5D from 248 
Figures 3D&F. The correlation was strong, with r = −0.87 and −0.89 for the two 249 
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adaptation types, accounting for more than 70% of the variance. This shows that the 250 
two measures covary together, consistent with their being driven by a common factor, 251 
most probably perceived stimulus strength.   252 
 253 
------------------------------  FIGURE 5 ------------------------------  254 
 255 
Control experiment: Effects of reward on confidence and reaction times 256 
In order to show that confidence and reaction times do not necessarily change with 257 
PSE, we devised a control experiment where we manipulated rewards. Here there was 258 
no adaptation, but participants played a point-based game, with three types of reward 259 
regimes (in different blocks). In baseline blocks, they received 1 point for each correct 260 
response and lost 1 for every error (performing on average at 85% correct). In “reward-261 
low” blocks, they received 2 points for correctly responding “less than”, and lost 1 each 262 
error; and in “reward-high”, 2 points for correctly responding “greater than”, losing 1 263 
for an error. This simple reward manipulation of rewards biased observers towards the 264 
double-reward response when uncertain, causing robust shifts in the PSE. Figure 6 A 265 
shows the psychometric functions for the aggregate observer for the three conditions. 266 
The PSE for the standard condition was 17.5 (a constant bias of 1.5 from the physical 267 
equivalent of 16), while for the “reward-low” condition it was 15.8 (1.7 lower) and for 268 
“reward-high” was 19.1 (1.6 higher). Both cases are near the predictions of the ideal 269 
observer (which predicts a shift of 1.2 towards the rewarded side).  270 
 However, the shift in PSE was not accompanied by concomitant shifts in 271 
confidence: the minima in the gaussians are very similar for all three conditions (17.4, 272 
17.1 & 18.0 for low, baseline and high). Similarly, the peak reaction times did not 273 
follow the PSEs, but again tended to cluster around the baseline PSE (16.3, 17.3 & 274 
17.6). The histograms below the confidence and RT curves show the bootstrap 275 
analysis, similar to that of Figure 4. The bootstraps clearly overlap considerably. 276 
Again, we tested the two plausible models outlined for Figure 4, counting, for each 277 
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condition, how many iterations were nearer to the PSE of that condition rather than to 278 
the PSE of the baseline (non-rewarded) condition. For the confidence measures the 279 
results were clear: the probabilities of model 2 (closer to the shifted PSE) being correct 280 
were p=0.046 for the reward-low condition, and p=10−4 for the reward-high condition, 281 
20 and 10,000 times less likely than model 1. The results for reaction times was 282 
similarly in favour of model 1, with probabilities for model 2 at p<10−4  for the reward-283 
low condition, and p=0.012 for the reward-high condition, infinite and 81 times less 284 
likely than model 1. Reaction times in this experiment may have been less reliable, 285 
because of variable slowing when integrating the reward “prior”. Again, the results 286 
from the aggregate observer are very similar to those obtained from analysis of 287 
individual participants (see supplemental material).  288 
 289 
------------------------------  FIGURE 6 ------------------------------  290 
 291 
Discussion 292 
The primary goal of this study was to probe the mechanisms of numerosity adaptation, 293 
to test whether adaptation affects sensory processing mechanisms directly, or indirectly 294 
via decision or response criteria. We argue that a change in sensory processing should 295 
result in a comparable change in minimum decision confidence and maximum 296 
reaction-times, which should shift to align with the point of subjective equality after 297 
adaptation, where the test and probe stimuli are, by definition, most similar 298 
perceptually. On the other hand, if the change in PSE results from a response bias, the 299 
peaks in confidence and reaction-times should not change with adaption (see Figure 300 
1). Our results clearly support the claim that adaptation affects sensory processing 301 
directly. Two types of adaptation – to visual patterns and to hand-tapping – caused 302 
large shifts in PSEs, with concomitant shifts in peak confidence and reaction-times. In 303 
all cases, the sensory processing model was far more probable than that suggested by 304 
confidence-induced shifts in response criteria. On the other hand, when the PSEs were 305 
 14 
shifted by awarding rewards for specific responses, the shifts in PSE were not 306 
accompanied by shifts in confidence or RTs.  307 
 The results are interesting for several reasons. Firstly, there has been a long-308 
standing debate about the nature of numerosity processing, particularly about whether 309 
it is sensed directly, or is a by-product of texture processing [17,18]. One of the 310 
strongest lines of evidence that numerosity is distinct from texture density comes from 311 
adaptation studies, particularly cross-modal and cross-format adaptation [7]: adapting 312 
to sequences of flashes or tones affects the perceived numerosity of dot arrays, difficult 313 
to ascribe to texture perception. The demonstration that adaptation to fast or slow hand-314 
tapping changes the perceived numerosity of spatial arrays is even more fascinating, 315 
as it links perception and action, implicating common mechanisms for perceiving and 316 
reproducing numerosity [8]. 317 
 However, paraphrasing Laplace [19]: “extraordinary claims require 318 
extraordinary evidence”. It is therefore reasonable to expect a rigorous demonstration 319 
that motor tapping affects the perception of numerosity directly, rather than merely 320 
biasing the decision or the response along the lines of Figure 1. The fact that all 321 
analyses show that both confidence and reaction-time peaks move to the adapted PSE 322 
strongly favours the hypothesis that adaptation causes changes at the sensory level. 323 
This has important ramifications for understanding the role of numerosity mechanisms 324 
in perception and action, relating well to the electrophysiological studies showing a 325 
clear selectivity for the number of self-produced actions in the area 5 of the superior 326 
parietal lobule of monkey [10,20]. 327 
 The other more general result of this study is a method of validating adaptation 328 
and other effects of temporal and spatial dependency (such as serial dependence [21–329 
24]. Adaptation is a fundamental tool in psychophysics, famously referred to as “the 330 
psychophysicist’s microelectrode” [11]. However, adaptation studies necessarily rely 331 
on subjective judgements, on participants reporting their subjective impressions. Most 332 
modern adaptation studies use two-alternative forced choice techniques that ask 333 
participants to compare the adapted test to a probe, yielding psychometric functions 334 
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from which the point of subjective equality can be titrated. However, unlike other 335 
forced choice tasks (such as measurement of contrast sensitivity), there is no right or 336 
wrong answer: just a subjective judgment that stimulus A was larger, brighter or more 337 
numerous than stimulus B. Over a considerable range around the point of subjective 338 
equality, judgments are difficult, but participants must respond, guessing if unsure. It 339 
requires only a slight tendency to respond stereotypically in one direction when unsure 340 
to shift the curves, robustly changing the PSE, without changing the slope of the 341 
function [13]. It therefore becomes important to have objective corroborative evidence 342 
that the point of subjective equality really reflects sensory changes rather than response 343 
biases. Gallagher et al. [14] suggested that minima in response criteria could provide 344 
useful corroboration, and demonstrated that it can do so for motion adaption (and also 345 
for serial dependence). We extend their idea, showing that even with a far more subtle 346 
forms of adaptation elicited by hand-tapping, the minima in confidence follow the 347 
changes in PSE.  348 
 We point out that we are testing a specific model of how decision criteria may 349 
affect PSEs: that a small tendency of response bias could affect trials of low 350 
confidence, causing reliable shifts in PSE [13]. With this particular model, as 351 
confidence is driving the response, it is unlikely to shift with the response PSE. 352 
However, other more complex models of perceptual decisions [25,26] may predict that 353 
confidence and RT do change with changes in PSE. Indeed, with these classes of 354 
models it is often difficult to distinguish experimentally between sensory and 355 
perceptual decision effects [27]. We therefore designed a realistic experiment that 356 
manipulated PSEs at the decisional level, by rewarding correct responses in a specific 357 
direction (high or low). This produced robust changes in responses, shifting the PSE 358 
as expected, as participants sought to optimize gains: however, the shifts in PSE were 359 
not accompanied by concomitant changes in confidence, nor in RTs. This is a clear 360 
existence proof that at least some types of manipulation on decisions are not paralleled 361 
by shifts in confidence, which may therefore be a signature of sensory changes. 362 
Gallagher et al. [14] performed a similar experiment, instructing participants 363 
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specifically to respond “left” or “right” when confidence is low, and also showed that 364 
this manipulation does not shift the point of minimal confidence. However, our task 365 
was more natural, in that we gave no instructions to participants on how to respond, 366 
nor that they should take confidence into account. It was a natural task with greater 367 
risks on one side than the other (like those pioneered by Trommershäuser and collegues 368 
[28]) which human participants soon learn to optimize. Yet this very natural and 369 
spontaneous task, which shifted PSEs smoothly, caused no similar shifts in confidence 370 
or RTs.  371 
In general, reaction-times provided more robust data than confidence for the 372 
sensory shifts in PSE. Reaction times could have several advantages to confidence 373 
measures. Firstly, they are objective and come at no extra cost, automatically encoded 374 
in the timestamps of the stimuli and responses, without having to ask participants to 375 
make a second response. Nor was it necessary to ask for a speeded response; we simply 376 
relied on the tendency of participants to respond reasonably quickly in order to finish 377 
the session as soon as possible. For the adaptation experiments, reaction-times proved 378 
to be more informative than confidence, in all cases providing stronger evidence for a 379 
shift in their peak. For example, for the aggregate data for adaptation to tapping, the 380 
Log10BF12 was 1.26 for confidence, compared with 2.22 for reaction-time data. For the 381 
analysis of individual data (where there are far fewer trials, hence more noisy 382 
estimates) the Log10BF12 for confidence was 1.14 compared with 2.46 for reaction-383 
times. In all cases the log10-Bayes factors were greater than 1, considered strong 384 
evidence, but the reaction-time data gave log10BF > 2, considered decisive [29]. There 385 
is considerable evidence showing that reaction times vary monotonically with signal 386 
strength [15], and should therefore be maximal at the point of least difference in the 387 
signals. Combined with the ease with which reaction-time data can be collected, with 388 
no additional load on participants, it would appear to be the preferred method.  389 
 To summarize, we present a new technique for investigating the mechanisms of 390 
numerosity adaptation and sensory adaptation in general. By simultaneously measuring 391 
subjective confidence and more importantly – reaction-times, we demonstrate that 392 
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adaptation to numerosity, either by observing visual stimuli of high numerosity or by 393 
subjects tapping in a particular region occurs at a sensory level, before stages of 394 
perceptual decision. Adaptation affects not only perceived numerosity, but also 395 
subjective confidence and reaction-times, showing that they are a consequence of 396 
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Figure 1. Simulation showing how response biases could induce a shift in psychometric function resembling a real 532 
sensory change. The red curve shows a hypothetical psychometric function for a numerosity discrimination task. The blue 533 
curve plots confidence level based on the relative numerosity difference between the stimuli. The green curve shows the 534 
result of a decision strategy “less if unconfident”, obtained by the pointwise product of two functions.  535 
 536 
 537 
Figure 2. Stimuli and procedure. On each trial subjects were required to which of two stimuli were more numerous, then 538 
indicate whether they were confident with their response (both responses 2AFC). In the visual adaptation condition, a 539 
dense dot array was displayed first for 40 s than for 6 s top-up periods at the test location before the discrimination task 540 
(top left). In the motor adaptation condition (top right), participants were required to tap their hand with index finger 541 
extended, for 6 s on the right side of the screen, with their hand concealed by the screen and without touching any surface 542 
to minimize sensory feedback. Subjects either tapped as fast as possible or slowly, at around 1 Hz (tested in separated 543 
sessions). In all conditions, reaction times between the offset of the reference and the numerosity response were measured, 544 
although participants were never requested to make any speeded response. 545 
 546 
 547 
Figure 3. A-B: Psychophysical functions showing proportion of trials in which the test was perceived more numerous 548 
than the reference, as a function of test numerosity. C-D: Confidence levels and mean reaction times (E-F) as a function 549 
of test numerosity, for visual and motor adaptation (left and right panels respectively). In all graphs, blue and red curves 550 
indicate baseline and high adaptation for visual adaptation (panels on left hand side) and slow or fast tapping in the motor 551 
experiment (on right hand side). The dashed lines show the PSEs and arrows the peaks of the best-fit gaussians to the 552 
confidence or reaction time distributions. 553 
 554 
 555 
Figure 4. Frequency distributions of bootstraps for confidence (A-B) and reaction-times (C-D), for visual or motor 556 
adaptation experiment (left and right panels respectively). Data in blue represent visual baseline or slow tapping condition 557 
and red for high visual adaptation or fast motor tapping). Orange distributions show the bootstrapped mid-points between 558 




Figure 5. Bar graphs show precision for numerosity discrimination in the high or low confidence trials. In blue, data for 562 
baseline (or slow tapping) and red data for adaptation to high (or fast tapping) for visual and motor adaptation.  (C-D) 563 
Reaction-times (averaged over trials and subjects) as a function of confidence (averaged over trials and subjects) for the 564 
two adaptation conditions. Black lines represent the best-fitting linear regressions (C visual adaptation: R2 = 0.76; D 565 
motor adaptation: R2 = 0.79). Error bar represent ±1 s.e.m., *** p < 0.0001. 566 
 567 
 568 
Figure 6. (A) Psychophysical functions of proportion of trials when the test was seen as more numerous than the neutral 569 
probe, as a function of physical numerosity in the control condition (baseline in orange, leftward condition in blue and 570 
rightward condition in red). (C) Expressions of confidence, as a function of physical numerosity. (C) Mean reaction-times 571 
(in seconds) as a function of physical numerosity. The continuous dotted lines indicate the PSE of the psychophysical 572 
curves. The histograms below the confidence and reaction time fits represent the bootstrap analysis.   573 
 574 
